Washington Law Review
Volume 3

Number 4

10-1-1928

Lectures on Legal Topics, vol. IV, 1922-23
Horton C. Force

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Horton C. Force, Book Review, Lectures on Legal Topics, vol. IV, 1922-23, 3 Wash. L. Rev. 195 (1928).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol3/iss4/5

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

RECENT CASES
officers could take cognizance of, and seize, the evidence of crime before
them. State v. McKinde7, 48 Wash. Dec. 148, 268 Pac. 593 (1928).
This is the first Washington case where this point has arisen. The
court states that the federal cases are to the contrary, but it is believed
that they are distinguishable on their facts. The requirements that search
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized, make general
searches under them impossible and prevent the seizure of one thing under
a warrant describing another. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 48
(1927), where under a search warrant for liquor
Sup. Ct. 74, 72 L. ed. a ledger was .seized. Papers and documents cannot be seized under a
search warrant for liquor United States v. Olmsted, 7 Fed (2nd) 760
(1925). While the language of these cases indicates a contrary view, they
deal with a totally different problem, namely, the seizure, under a search
warrant for other things, of books, papers and documents which are not
on their face contraband. The papers and documents of themselves are not
subject to seizure, and admittedly the right to search and seize under a
search warrant is limited to the things described therein. A warrant to
search for smuggled goods cannot be used to search for evidence of violation of the prohibition act. United States v. Moore, 4 Fed (2nd) 600
(1925). But this does not mean that if an officer in searching for things
under a warrant, sees contraband or articles being used in the commission
of a crime, he may not seize them. He does not do this by virtue of his
warrant but in performance of his general duty to prevent the commission
United
of crime. State v. Muetzel, 121 Ore. 561, 254 Pac. 1010 (1927)
States v. Camaorta et al. (D. C.), 278 Fed. 388 (1922). Contra,People v.
Preuss, 225 Mich. 115, 195 N. W 684 (1923) holding that an officer executing a search warrant for stolen beans may not seize intoxicating liquors
found on the premises. The Michigan court cites only TIFFANY, C R. LAW
362, and RULING CASE LAW. "If the warrant directs the seizure of a certain
kind of property, a seizure of an entirely different kind, constitutes the
officer a trespasser." 24 R. C. L. 709. This statement is based on State v.
Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097, 87 A. S. R. 711 (1901), which merely held
that under a warrant for stolen goods, a letter could not be seized. This
is a different case. The letter, not being contraband on its face, if subject
to seizure, was only so by virtue of the warrant, and the warrant did not
include the letter. The contraband, however, is subject to seizure because
of its nature, and this right on the part of the officer is independent of
the search warrant, except that the latter gives him a lawful right to be
on the premises. It will be conceded that the officer can only make a
search for the things designated in his search warrant; but if in making
this search he incidentally sees contraband, there is no valid objection to
his seizing it. It might be difficult to show, as in the principal case, that
the officer was searching for liquor, and was not searching for stolen goods,
(merely happening upon them in the course of his search for liquor), but
that is a question of proof and does not militate against the principle
M. A. M.
laid down.

BOOK REVIEWS
LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics, Vol. iv, 1922-23. By various authors. New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1928. pp. viii, 393.
As appears from the title page, this book is a series of seventeen lectures delivered before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
in the winter of 1922-23 by thirteen lawyers, judges and law teachers from
New York City and elsewhere. The subjects vary greatly and also the
manner of treatment, ranging from reminiscences of practice, with hints
to young lawyers, through closely reasoned lectures on the history of the
law and the development of the theories on which it is based, to prophecies
as to its future development.
Through all the lectures runs the thought that while the law should be
stable and so far as possible certain, yet it is a living and growing science,
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and that gradual but constant change is necessary to fit old precepts to
new conditions.
The most closely reasoned lectures, and the ones deserving the most
careful reading are the series of three by Dean Roscoe Pound on the
"Theory of Judicial Decision." In the first one, Dean Pound points out
that we are on the eve of a period of creative activity in the law following
a more stable period of working out in detail the ideals which had been
established in the preceding creative period which followd the Revolution, during which period English legal institutions and doctrines were
made over to conform to an ideal of American society by the criterion of
applicability to American conditions. Ordinarily creation is not making
something out of nothing, it is making something new out of old materials.
In the same way, legal creation is the reshaping of traditional legal materials, the bringing in of other materials from without and the adaptation
of these materials as a whole to the securing of human claims and the satisfaction of human wants under new conditions of life in civilized society
thus approaching the ideals toward which we are striving. As these
ideals change, the interpretation naturally changes. There is always the
conflict between the old which considers that whatever is, is right, ana
the new which is trying to modify the old precepts of the law to fit the
new conditions of life. These might be typified by the rule requiring
strict interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law and the
fact that a statute is passed to remedy a defect in the common law or to
meet a need which developing civilization has shown to exist. This constant process of conflict and change is developed at length in the first two
lectures while in the third Dean Pound gives suggestions as to the method
of reasoning that should be used in future to attain justice according to
law. As he says: "The judges have been doing their work well. The real
responsibility is upon our jurists and teachers to rationalize the process
of judicial decision for the purposes of today and not rest content with
the rationalizings for the purpose of the past that have come down to
them, to substitute a larger and more varied picture of the end of law
and a better and more critically drawn idealization of the legal and social
order of the present for the simple picture of the past with its broad
lines and impressionistic details." If our teachers, lawyers and judges
will read, mark, learn and inwardly digest these three articles, and apply
their principles in the teaching in law schools, in the presentation of cases
before the courts, and in the decisions of the cases presented, they will
make a forward step in the attainment of.justice according to law
"Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification," in which Mr.
Justice Stone makes a suggestion as to the best manner of utilizing the
work of the American Law Institute when that shall have progressed far
enough for publication, and "The Tyranny of Judicial Precedure," by Mr.
Sherman Whipple of the Boston Bar, are related to the matters discussed
in Dean Pound's articles and should be read and considered with them
as giving a somewhat different approach to what is really the same
problem.
The address by Mr. Banton, District Attorney of New York County is
particularly illuminating, both in his suggestions for the improvement in
the methods of enforcing criminal law and the speeding up of criminal
trials and also in his statement of what his office has actually been able
to accomplish even under the present cumbersome system of New York,
and the effect that the more speedy administration of justice has had in
inducing certain former residents of New York to live elsewhere.
The article by Judge Manton on the International Court of Justice and
the article by Mr. Terry on the Judicial Settlement of Industrial Disputes under the Kansas Law, are both interesting as prophecies of what
should come to pass. The actual results which have been attained the
five years since their delivery have not been as great as were hoped by
the speakers, but one may still hope that in spite of the limitations placed
upon the Kansas Industrial Court, the idea which it embodies will in time
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be worked out on a practical basis, giving industrial peace and security to
the general consuming public.
The analysis of the Uniform Conditional Sales Law, by Dean Bogert of
the Cornell Law School, is of interest because it traces the development in
different states of the varying rules in regard to conditional sales and the
reasons for the choice of those adopted by the commissioners on uniform
laws. In this connection it is interesting to note that the act was drafted
with the aid of leading business men engaged in selling on conditional
sale, and that the act "embodies the opinions and views of a body of
business men more than it does the views of a body of teachers of law."
This act has been adopted in many states and as it will probably come up
before the Washington Legislature in the near future, a careful study of
this article will give a good idea of the changes which its adoption will
bring. The most important change from the theory now in force in
Washington is the recognition of the fact that in spite of the difference in
phraseology, a conditional sale is, like a bill of sale with a chattel mortgage back, really a method of security to a seller on credit.
The address by Solicitor General Beck on the Supreme Court gives a
vivid picture of the early days when that court was "a court of leisure,
deliberation and dignity, where men had the time and took the pains to
exhaust the possibilities of reasoning and where the clash of mind With
mind attracted attention in the public mind to which only a world's champion baseball match is today comparable." The present court does not
attract the crowds and cannot give the time for argument, but as Mr.
Beck points out, the questions before it are no less important and farreaching, the arguments and opinions are as able and lawyers often come
ten times as far and get less than one-tenth the time for argument.
The concluding address on the "Need of the Right of Local Self Government," by Mr. Marbury of Baltimore, sounds a warning against the
tendency toward centralization, and while it will meet with disagreement
on the part of many a reader, deserves consideration. While there is, of
course, a difference in the weight of the various addresses, every one is
interesting and worth reading, and the weightier ones are worth careful
HORTON C. FoRcE.*
study.
* Of the Seattle Bar.
HAiNwo0K oiN INTE R NATIONAL LAW. By George Grafton Wilson. 2nd edition. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1927. pp. xxi, 567.
Dr. Wilson of Harvard University has, in the present revision, brought
down to date his volume on international law. This is one of the useful
manuals of the Hornbook series, which includes elementary treatises on
all the principal subjects of the law. The book follows the other Hornbooks in its essential features, with a statement of leading principles in
headnotes, a brief but thorough commentary, and references to authorities
in the form of notes. It provides today, as it did when first published in
1910, a most authoritative brief elucidation of the general principles of
international law. It is, indeed, as comprehensive as the ordinary text
on international law used in the department of political science and the
colleges of liberal arts.
In this revision the author has wisely followed a sane middle course.
Much time is wasted by many writers in taking up the old debate as to
whether international law is really law. The answer to such a question
begins and ends with the definition of law. No time is lost debating such
a question. Moreover, some writers have advocated the general revision
of the substance of international law, on the theory that much of what
was deemed to be the old law has been swept aside, and a new law has
come into being. The author has wisely taken the view that these changes
are far less revolutionary than many have assumed. He has therefore
retained substantially the method and content of the first edition, with
revisions and additions which make it a complete statement of the law
as it is today.
Dr. Wilson has also refrained from a tendency which is manifested in

